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UBER, THE TAYLOR REVIEW, MUTUALITY, AND THE DUTY TO NOT MISREPRESENT EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS 
Ewan McGaughey*  
 
Abstract 
Do employing entities have a responsibility to not misrepresent the employment status of  their staff ? This article 
suggests that recent jurisprudence does create this responsibility. The article starts, first, by discussing the much-
awaited Taylor Review, released in July 2017. This purported to address the problems of  employment rights and tax 
in the software driven ‘gig’ economy. Four main groups of  Taylor’s recommendations were to relabel employment 
statuses and write more secondary legislation, reform tax, cut paid holidays, and introduce new ‘soft’ labour rights. 
These proposals do not address the real issues. Second, this article explains why a test for employment status 
highlighted by Taylor – ‘mutuality of  obligation’ – has not formed part of  binding UK Supreme Court jurisprudence 
since Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher. Third, it discusses what the Taylor Review did not: the problem of  misrepresentation of  
employment status, which has become closely associated with the gig economy. In October 2017, the Supreme Court 
issued a pathbreaking judgment that changed the requirements for fraud cases, aligning the tests for civil and criminal 
fraud, and therefore making fraud claims easier. This is relevant because of  the very serious finding, in Aslam v Uber 
BV [2017] IRLR 4, [96] by the Employment Tribunal that Uber provided an ‘excellent illustration... of  “armies of  
lawyers” contriving documents in their clients’ interests which simply misrepresent the true rights and obligations on 
both sides’. This raises the question of  whether ‘contriving’ to ‘misrepresent’ something enables fraud claims, either 
by staff  who seek employment rights, or by public authorities for tax receipts or social security contributions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A problem of  labour law across the world is that while ‘everyone’ has the universal human right to social 
security, fair pay, unions, equality and leisure,1 rights must be enforced. Mostly,2 the days are past when 
men like F.W. Taylor denigrated their staff, saying an ‘intelligent gorilla’ could be trained to be ‘more 
efficient... than any man can be’.3 Most organisations treat their staff  as human beings, not ‘human 
resources’, with rights that managers themselves expect. They abide by law. But in the ‘gig economy’, some 
are still denying that their employees’ rights exist. Enforcement mechanisms have strained across the 
globe. A United States DC Circuit Court case, FedEx Home Delivery v National Labor Relations Board shows 
                                                     
* Lecturer, School of  Law, King’s College, London. Research Associate, Centre for Business Research, University of  
Cambridge. Please contact me at ewan.mcgaughey@kcl.ac.uk. I am very grateful for comments, discussion and advice to Zoe 
Adams, Valerio De Stefano, Jeremias Prassl, Abi Adams, Sonia McKay, Ben Jones, Sarah Fraser Butlin, Liv Jores, Simon 
Deakin, Patrick Elias, and the staff  of  Oxford University Press.  
1 Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 1948 arts 22-24. Those rights are jus cogens norms of  international law, and binding on 
the UK through its International Labour Organisation membership, and ratification of  the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966 arts 7-9  
2 See JC Wong, ‘Uber CEO Travis Kalanick caught on video arguing with driver about fares’ (1 March 2017) Guardian, the 
CEO saying to a driver employee, who was bankrupted after Uber unilaterally varied its percentage of  driver fares, ‘Some 
people don’t like to take responsibility for their own shit. They blame everything in their life on somebody else. Good luck!’ 
3 FW Taylor, The Principles of  Scientific Management (1911) 40   
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the problem’s extent.4 FedEx lawyer Ted Cruz (who later likened himself  to ‘the Uber of  Washington’5) 
submitted that, if  they assume ‘entrepreneurial opportunity’, people are independent contractors, not 
employees. Cruz won that case, but in dissent, Garland J said this was not the common law test. He could 
‘detect no such evolution’ in the law.6 Garland J, who remains on the DC Circuit, reflected the law in most 
countries. A combination of  control, personal work, economic reality and bargaining power,7 define 
employment status and rights for the vast majority of  people across the globe.8  
 In this context – with serious advocates of  ‘government shut down’ spreading9 – a new report 
was submitted to the UK government: Good Work: The Taylor Review of  Modern Working Practices (July 2017). 
Many hoped that the Taylor Review would draw on legal expertise, make concrete proposals and support 
international labour standards, even against powerful corporate interests. They were disappointed. This 
article will (1) summarise the Taylor Review’s essential points, (2) explain why the ‘mutuality of  obligation’ 
concept, which Taylor highlights, is no part of  the law for employees, and (3) discuss the pathbreaking 
new Supreme Court case law on the meaning of  fraud. It discusses whether this could be applied to 
employing entities, which have been found to hire ‘armies of  lawyers’ who are ‘contriving documents in 
their clients’ interests which simply misrepresent the true rights and obligations on both sides’.10  
 
1. TAYLOR REVIEW 
The Taylor Review was much awaited by people across the labour movement, government, and industry. 
On its release, and though it is a lengthy document, it essentially contained four main groups of  
recommendation. First, we should relabel the intermediate ‘workers’ category as ‘dependent contractors’, 
and make ‘greater use of  secondary legislation’ to clarify what the categories mean.11 Second, it says that 
tax levels for employed and self-employed ‘should be moved closer to parity’.12 It applauds the ‘Estonian 
Tax and Custom Board’ who ‘have been working with Uber’ on a ‘project which simplifies taxation for 
Sharing Economy Workers’.13 Third, it says that ‘rolled-up holiday pay’ should be re-introduced. Instead 
of  getting holidays, people get an entry of  ‘12.07 per cent’ in their pay slips.14 Fourth, it advocates a new 
range of  ‘soft’ rights: for people to request (but not have) a direct contract or fixed hours, to be consulted 
                                                     
4 563 F3d 492 (DC 2009). The results of  the majority decision, that truck drivers for FedEx had no right to collectively bargain, 
probably violates the ILO Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (c 98), a core Convention in international law. 
5 See B Bordelon, ‘Ted Cruz: I’m Just the Uber of  Washington’ (16 December 2014) National Review, likening himself  to a 
‘disruptive app’.  
6 See US v Silk, 331 US 704 (1947) and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Darden, 503 US 318 (1992)  
7 On three main elements of  bargaining power, see A Smith, The Wealth of  Nations (London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776) Book I, 
ch 8, §12 (ability to ‘hold out’ in negotiations from greater resources), JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (London: Parkier, 
1848) Book V, ch XI, §12 (advantages in taking collective action) and WS Jevons, Theory of  Political Economy (1888) ch 4, §74 
(advantages in information).  
8 Basic standards are reflected in the ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation 2006 (no 198) Preamble, ss 5 and 12. 
See further Z Adams, L Bishop, and S Deakin, CBR Labour Regulation Index (Dataset of  117 Countries) (2016)  
9 e.g. K Lee, ‘Trump says we need a government shutdown. Here’s what’s happened in the past’ (7 May 2017) LA Times  
10 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4, [96]  
11 Taylor Review (2017) 34  
12 Taylor Review (2017) 72  
13 Taylor Review (2017) 80 
14 Taylor Review (2017) 47 
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on (not participate in) company decisions with over two workers, and for ‘naming and shaming’ of  
employers who fail to pay Tribunal awards (not contempt of  court).15 All this apparently flowed from 
Taylor’s ‘single overriding ambition’ that all ‘work in the UK economy should be fair and decent’.16  
 It is wholly unclear how the Review’s proposals meet the aim. First, relabelling ‘worker’ status (like 
rebranding the ‘minimum’ as a ‘living wage’17) does not change the law. The Employment Relations Act 
1999 section 23 already enables government to pass orders for more people to get employment status.18 It 
has not been used. Even if  it had been, social rights, like access to justice,19 must not be an on-off  switch, 
flipped at the Executive’s discretion. Second, tax reform is needed. But a corporation like Uber, which has 
been directly accused of  evading value added tax,20 corporation tax,21 and indirectly accused of  evading 
income tax and National Insurance,22 is probably not well placed to advise the UK or any government on 
how tax should work. Third, reintroducing ‘rolled-up holiday pay’ would, as the litigation to ban that 
practice showed in 2006,23 be the same as abolishing paid holidays. For anyone earning more than the 
minimum wage, employers will probably reduce wages by the rolled up holiday pay rate. This eliminates 
the right, and deprives the law of  its social objective: that people actually take holidays.24 Fourth, rights to 
request rights, be consulted or cause publicity, do not work when firms have strong conflicting monetary 
incentives. Agency work, zero hours’ contracts, and aggressive sham self-employment contracts are used 
because the law is not being enforced. This creates a regulatory subsidy for unfair work.  
 While calling for ‘Clarity in the law’ (chapter 5) and criticising ‘ambiguous legislation’, the Taylor 
Review is loaded with obscure platitudes. Its ‘Seven steps toward fair and decent work with realistic scope 
for development and fulfilment’ (chapter 14) exemplify this. It says ‘good work’ is something ‘for which 
we all need to take responsibility’. It says that ‘flexibility and... opportunities... should be protected while 
ensuring fairness’. It also says that law ‘should help firms make the right choices’,25 that ‘companies should 
be seen to take good work seriously’, and we should ‘record and enhance the capabilities developed in 
formal and informal learning’. We should ‘develop a proactive approach to workplace health’. Lastly, 
people should ‘progress in their current and future work’.26 These words do not mean anything. They are 
                                                     
15 Taylor Review (2017) 63 
16 Taylor Review (2017) 6  
17 See E McGaughey, ‘All in ‘It’ Together: Worker Wages Without Worker Votes’ (2016) 27(1) King’s Law Journal 1  
18 Employment Relations Act 1999 s 23, referring to rights under TULRCA 1992, ERA 1996 and ‘any instrument made under 
section 2(2) of  the European Communities Act 1972’.  
19 Exemplified by R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 (holding Employment Tribunal fees ultra vires). 
20 J Croft and M Murgia, ‘Uber faces legal challenge on paying VAT’ (20 March 2017) FT. T Connelly, ‘An Uber-legal challenge: 
Jolyon Maugham QC crowdfunds more than £100,000 to launch VAT High Court case’ (27 July 2017) Legal Cheek  
21 ‘Uber pays £22,000 tax on £866,000 UK profit’ (20 October 2015) Guardian and O Williams-Grut, ‘Uber’s rival says it uses 
‘tax avoidance on an industrial scale,’ and wants Europe to investigate’ (31 July 2015) Business Insider  
22 e.g. P Mason, ‘Bogus self-employment exploits workers and scams the taxman’ (13 March 2017) Guardian, referring obliquely 
to the idea that ‘cab driver’ for whom ‘you paid an app’.  
23 Robinson-Steele v RD Retail Services Ltd (2006) C-131/04, [48] ‘the entitlement of  every worker to paid annual leave must be 
regarded as a particularly important principle of  Community social law from which there can be no derogations 
24 See further UDHR 1948 art 24  
25 Taylor Review (2017) 110 
26 Taylor Review (2017) 111 
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the opposite of  what Lord Wedderburn called ‘hard legal analysis allied to an alternative social vision’,27 
just incoherent third way rhetoric, when people want a real way forth. The Taylor Review must therefore 
be regarded as a squandered opportunity. 
 Perhaps the Review’s most regrettable feature is its misleading statements about the present law. 
First, in 115 pages, it refers to just one single case: Aslam v Uber BV.28 Upheld to the letter in the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal,29 Uber drivers are entitled to the minimum wage and holiday pay. They are 
workers. As explained below, on the case’s findings of  fact, it is arguable that they are employees too. But 
the Review says the Tribunal judgment ‘only applies to the two drivers who brought the case’.30 This 
fundamentally misunderstands the doctrine of  precedent in common law, as recently explained by the 
Supreme Court in R(UNISON) v Lord Chancellor. Decisions in cases have the function of  providing 
guidance about how future courts will decide similar issues in the future. Using the example of  Donoghue v 
Stevenson, as Lord Reed put it, to say that a decision in a case is ‘no value to anyone other’ than the litigants, 
the ‘lawyers and judges involved in the case would be absurd.’31  
 Second, the Review says that we should ‘align the employment status framework with the tax 
status framework’, as if  this has not been the consistent jurisprudence since Young and Woods Ltd v West.32 
It also appears to imply, without any justification, that a ‘temporary cessation of  work’ of  just one week 
necessarily breaks an employment contract.33 This is completely wrong under statute and House of  Lords 
authority.34 But third, and most misleading of  all, is the Review presumes without any justification, that 
‘those working in the gig economy’ are not already employees in law.35 One reason for this presumption 
could be that it argued that the current legal tests include ‘whether there are ongoing contractual 
obligations to provide and perform work (sometimes known as mutuality of  obligation)’.36 There is no 
doubt that this notorious test has lingered in the worse side of  case law, but the next part explains what 
should be regarded as the dominant legal opinion: it should be no part of  the law. 
 
2. ‘MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION’ IS NOT A TEST FOR EMPLOYMENT 
The lack of  enforcement has been a consistent theme in labour law’s scope since 1983, after Lord 
                                                     
27 KW Wedderburn, Labour Law and Freedom (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992) Preface. See further KD Ewing et al, A 
Manifesto for Labour Law: towards a comprehensive revision of  workers’ rights (Liverpool: IER 2016) iv, reviewed in [2017] 46(1) ILJ 
169  
28 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4 
29 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] UKEAT 0056_17_1011  
30 Taylor Review (2017) 63, and further ‘many have suggested that the judgment... means all Uber drivers are workers’.  
31 See R(UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [67]-[69] onwards, from ‘It may be helpful to begin by explaining briefly 
the importance of  the rule of  law, and the role of  access to the courts in maintaining the rule of  law.’ 
32 Young and Woods Ltd v West [1980] EWCA Civ 6 
33 Taylor Review (2017) 45. It is impossible to know what the Review’s authors were thinking, because they give no references. 
34 Under ERA 1996 s 212 and Ford v Warwickshire CC [1983] 2 AC 71 (where a teacher who had a summer break still had 
employment continuity) a week in which there is no contract of  employment can still count towards continuity of  
employment if  there is no cessation of  work. The Taylor Review appears to say that s 212 is the only meaningful route 
towards maintaining continuity since establishing an umbrella or global contract is ‘difficult in circumstances where there is 
genuine flexibility on both sides’ but this statement is highly problematic for reasons discussed below. 
35 Taylor Review (2017) 37 
36 Taylor Review (2017) 33 
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Denning retired from being Master of  the Rolls.37 It afflicts casual, agency, zero hours, and now gig-
economy staff. Mostly, these are the very people for whom Parliament has guaranteed rights. They were 
guaranteed rights in law, because they lack power to bargain for rights in the market.38 But in O’Kelly v 
Trusthouse Forte Ltd, a new Court of  Appeal led by Sir John Donaldson MR, held that for casual waiters 
(seeking to unionise) to be ‘employees’, their employer had to have accepted an ongoing duty to offer 
work, and the staff  an ongoing duty to accept it. This threatened to drive a conceptual coach and horses 
through every labour right, because an employer could simply say ‘we owe no rights because we drafted 
the contract to deny an ongoing duty to offer and accept work’. If  contractual consent is a requirement 
for a right, the very right is lost. On the face of  it, the House of  Lords immediately qualified O’Kelly’s 
effect  in the context of  the statutory concept of  continuity of  employment in Ford v Warwickshire CC. 
This confirmed that temporary breaks in employment (like casual workers might have) may not matter for 
the purpose of  maintaining statutory employment rights.39 Today it is clear the right to unionise is 
universal.40  
 But even after Ford, rival tests ran like parallel worlds through nearly thirty years of  case law.41 One 
line of  case law held up the O’Kelly definition of  mutuality.42 This morphed into two ideas. First, this 
‘mutuality of  obligation’ was said to be required during any period of  work. This was argued, for example, 
to deny employee status to staff  like the O’Kelly waiters, who were ostensibly under no ‘obligation’ to show 
up for any particular assignment. This is an argument to evade employment rights, because any employer 
would be able to simply write a contract denying any duty to call someone up exists: it attempts to make 
all casual or ‘zero hours’ contract staff  self-employed.  
 Second, it was said that O’Kelly mutuality is necessary for an employment contract to exist 
between specific periods of  working activity. Supposedly, agency staff  or ‘on demand’ staff  on ‘zero 
hours’ would lose employee rights between periods of  active work. This is like saying someone ceases to 
be an employee every time they have a weekend or take a lunch break, and is also an attempt to evade 
employment rights. It has been consistently rejected in case law on the minimum wage and working time,43 
                                                     
37 cf  Cassidy v Ministry of  Health [1951] 2 KB 343, Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison v MacDonald & Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101, and Bank 
voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Slatford [1953] 1 QB 248.  
38 e.g. Second Reading of  Contracts of  Employment Act 1963, Conservative Minister for Labour, John Hare MP, ‘I repeat that 
these are minimum standards. The object of  the Bill is not only to bring everybody up to the minimum but also to encourage 
employers to improve on the minimum on a voluntary basis.’ Hansard HC Debs (14 February 1963) vol 671, col 1505  
39 Noted in P Davies and M Freedland, Labour Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn 1984) 100, and see also ERA 1996 s 212. 
40 See Wilson v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 552 and Universal Declaration of  Human Rights 1948 art 23(4) replicated in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 art 8 or ILO Convention 98.    
41 S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (6th edn 2012) 164 ff 
42 See James v Greenwich LBC [2008] EWCA Civ 35 and Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] UKHL 47, opinion given by Lord 
Irvine LC, previously counsel for employer in O’Kelly, appointed by ex Prime Minister Blair, counsel for the employer in 
Nethermere. Carmichael was not referred to in Autoclenz and should be regarded as overruled.  
43 e.g. British Nursing Association v Inland Revenue [2002] EWCA Civ 494, [19] per Buxton LJ, ‘the alternative that is apparently 
contended for by the appellant, that the employees are only working when they are actually dealing with phone calls with all 
the periods spent waiting for calls excluded, would, in my view effectively make a mockery of  the whole system of  the 
minimum wage.’ Neuberger J and Peter Gibson LJ agreed. Note that for the minimum wage, the nurses only needed to be 
workers, but were plainly employees as well.  
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and this rejection is partially codified in the statutory continuity provisions.44 In response, some cases said 
that an ‘umbrella contract’ could be deduced from an arrangement, a concept which appears to have been 
invented off  the cuff  in O’Kelly.45 But why should that be needed? In absence of  any statement an 
employment relationship should simply be deemed to be indefinite. Precisely because of  this, an 
employment contract can only be terminated according to law, requiring notice and good faith dealing.46  
 Aside from all this, the other line of  cases was to the effect that the only mutual obligations 
needed for a contract are consideration: work for a wage,47 and no need for O’Kelly mutuality during, or 
between, active work. Then in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher, the UK Supreme Court ended the debate. It set out 
an exhaustive multi-factor test for who is an employee. Twenty car valets, working through an 
intermediary agent, claimed the minimum wage and holiday pay. They needed to be workers, and were 
successful because they were also employees. The Supreme Court recalled three factors from Ready Mixed 
Concrete,48 and then recapitulated them in light of  authorities it approved.49 These are (i) there is the 
‘irreducible minimum obligation on each side to create a contract of  service’ which was defined as 
‘consideration’,50 (ii) the employer may exercise control ‘in a sufficient degree’, and (iii) there is personal 
performance of  work, mostly ‘by one’s own hands’ although a limited power of  delegation may exist. 
Underpinning these factors is an overall guiding principle that ‘the relative bargaining power of  the parties 
must be taken into account in deciding whether the terms of  any written agreement in truth represent 
what was agreed’.51  
 At no stage did the Supreme Court accept, or even indirectly refer to the O’Kelly concept of  
mutuality, or any cases that endorse it.52 It did the opposite. The Supreme Court in Autoclenz specifically 
endorsed the ‘consideration’ view of  mutuality in the ‘critical findings’ of  Foxwell J: that ‘there were 
mutual obligations, namely the provision of  work in return for money’.53 Furthermore, it referred to 
Stephenson LJ’s judgment in Nethermere v (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner, which expressly defined mutual 
obligations as consideration,54 not an ongoing duty to offer and accept work. Indeed, Stephenson LJ was 
                                                     
44 Employment Rights Act 1996 s 212. S Deakin and G Morris, Labour Law (2016) 222, say s 212 ‘can be read as giving statutory 
recognition to certain extra-contractual expectations of  the employee.’ See also A Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and 
Arms (1763) Part 1, ‘The foundation of  contract is the reasonable expectation...’ 
45 See O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1984] QB 90, 124-5.  
46 ERA 1996 ss 86, 94, 135 and Wilson v Racher [1974] ICR 428, approved in West London Mental Health NHS Trust v Chhabra 
[2013] UKSC 80, [35]-[37] also acknowledging ‘an implied contractual right to a fair process’ (regardless of  qualifying 
periods). 
47 See McMeechan v Secretary of  State for Employment [1996] EWCA Civ 1166, and note its absence in Dacas v Brook Street Bureau 
(UK) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 217, and Cable & Wireless plc v Muscat [2006] EWCA Civ 220.  
48 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of  Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, relying on US v Silk 331 US 
704 (1947)  
49 Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41, [18]-[19]   
50 [2011] UKSC 41, [18] refers to Nethermere [1984] ICR 612, 623, which quotes MacKenna J, as below. 
51 [2011] UKSC 41, [35]  
52 Notably, there is no mention of  the entirely inconsistent decision of  Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] UKHL 47, where 
the lead judgment was given by Lord Irvine LC, who was previously the advocate for the employer in O’Kelly.  
53 [2011] UKSC 41, [37]  
54 [1984] ICR 612, 623, per Stephenson LJ, ‘Of  (iii) MacKenna J. proceeded to give some valuable examples, none on all fours 
with this case. I do not quote what he says of  (i) and (ii) except as to mutual obligations: “There must be a wage or other 
remuneration. Otherwise there will be no consideration, and without consideration no contract of  any kind. The 
servant must be obliged to provide his own work and skill.”’ Emphasis added.  
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plainly rejecting the O’Kelly definition, because he knew that counsel (Mr Anthony Blair) had been 
submitting that it was relevant in the Employment Appeal Tribunal.55 The Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union said in 2004 that O’Kelly mutuality is ‘of  no consequence’.56 This was clearly right.  
 No principled argument exists for why the O’Kelly definition of  mutuality should be part of  the 
law. First, Parliament has never consented to it, and probably never would, because it is a conceptual 
vehicle to undermine labour rights. Second, the overwhelming majority of  legal opinion rejects its place in 
the law. As well as the UK Supreme Court in Autoclenz, and the Court of  Justice of  the EU in Allonby, 
those highly critical of  O’Kelly include (to list just a few) Sir Bob Hepple,57 Professor Sandra Fredman,58 
Professor Simon Deakin and Professor Gillian Morris,59 Professor Catherine Barnard,60 Professor Hugh 
Collins,61 and the list goes on. When Professor Mark Freedland (who equally rejects O’Kelly) revived the 
analysis of  an employment contract often involving ongoing obligations, this was an observation designed 
to throw light on the juridical structure of  employment, not a proposal for a test.62  
 But now in Supreme Court case law, a consistent, principled position has developed. Employees 
are those with less in ‘relative bargaining power’. Workers in the intermediate category, like in Clyde & Co 
LLP v Bates van Winkelhof,63 will be analogous to law firm partners: with more relative capacity to bargain 
for rights, not less, than the general employee. A plumber earning well above the UK median wage might 
be another example, but is certainly in a grey zone.64 The principle must depend on whether people can 
genuinely bargain rights for themselves with their employers, but are in the scope of  enterprise risk and 
responsibility against the employer’s ‘clients’ or ‘customers’.65 In Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd, the Supreme 
Court squarely stated the reasons. Here, a widow successfully claimed that her late-husband’s employer 
breached an implied term, taking irrelevant considerations into account, when finding he committed 
suicide. A suicide finding meant the employer would not pay death benefits. According to Lady Hale, ‘the 
party who is charged with making decisions which affect the rights of  both parties to the contract has a 
clear conflict of  interest. That conflict is heightened where there is a significant imbalance of  power 
between the contracting parties as there often will be in an employment contract.’66  
                                                     
55 [1983] ICR 319  
56 Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College (2004) C-256/01, [72] for classification of  a worker: ‘The fact that no obligation is 
imposed on them to accept an assignment is of  no consequence in that context...’ The same is true in all other jurisdictions: V 
De Stefano, ‘Casual Work Beyond the Casual in the EU’ (2016) 7(3) European Labour Law Journal 421, 436-9 
57 B Hepple, ‘Restructuring Employment Rights’ (1986) 15(1) ILJ 69, 71, O’Kelly ‘deliberately ignored’ Freedland’s analysis.  
58 S Fredman, ‘Labour Law in Flux: The Changing Composition of  the Workforce’ (1997) 26 ILJ 337, 347, ‘a long shadow’ 
59 S Deakin and G Morris, Labour Law (6th edn 2012) 164, ‘it cannot therefore function as an indicator of  employee status.’ 
60 C Barnard, ‘The Personal Scope of  the Employment Relationship’ (2004) JILPT Comparative Labor Law Seminar, ‘invidious’  
61 H Collins, KD Ewing and A McColgan, Labour Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn 2005) 165, that m.o.o. is ‘consideration’ 
62 MR Freedland, The Contract of  Employment (1976) 21-22. See O Gierke, The Social Role of  Private Law (1889) 32, on ‘relations 
that begin in contract but last over a period of  time’, translated by E McGaughey in (2018) German Law Journal 
(forthcoming)  
63 Clyde & Co LLP v Bates van Winkelhof  [2014] UKSC 32  
64 Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith [2017] EWCA Civ 51, [45] ‘receipts of  £130,753... expenses totalling £82,454.’ cf  Stringfellow 
Restaurants Ltd v Quashie [2012] EWCA Civ 1735 which has been subjected to considerable criticism in E Albin, ‘The Case of  
Quashie: Between the Legalisation of  Sex Work and the Precariousness of  Personal Service Work’ (2013) 42(2) ILJ 180.  
65 Catholic Child Welfare Society v Institute of  the Brothers of  the Christian Schools [2012] UKSC 56, [67] and [75] on the principles. See 
further S Deakin, ‘‘Enterprise Risk’: The Juridical Nature of  the Firm Revisited’ (2003) 32 Industrial Law Journal 97.  
66 Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17, [18]  
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 What must be avoided is that the people with the least bargaining power lose employee rights in a 
sham contract, as a conflicted employer profits from their labour. There are inconsistent Court of  Appeal 
judgments. It was particularly regrettable that binding Supreme Court authority, like Autoclenz, was barely 
engaged with in cases like Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd.67 As the Supreme Court put it in Gisda Cyf  v Barratt, 
the ‘need to segregate intellectually common law principles relating to contract law, even in the field of  
employment, from statutorily conferred rights is fundamental.’68  
 
3. UBER AND THE DUTY NOT TO MISREPRESENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
 
(1) THE MEANING OF FRAUD 
Legitimate legal argument must be distinguished from profit-driven evasion of  other people’s rights. This 
raises the question of  whether sham self-employment could generate a claim for fraud. It used to be the 
case that mistakes and misrepresentations about the law were not actionable, but this position was altered 
by the House of  Lords in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council.69 After this, the principle was applied in 
tenants’ rights cases. For example, in Pankhania v Hackney London Borough Council, a claimant argued the 
council had misrepresented that a property, sold by auction, was occupied by a licensee. In fact, all the 
legal requirements for a tenancy under Street v Mountford existed. Therefore the council was liable to pay 
damages for misrepresentation.70  
 Nevertheless, fraud claims are inherently problematic. Their dimensions were often poorly 
understood as until October 2017, two main meanings of  fraud existed in criminal and civil law.71 
However, in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd, the Supreme Court confirmed that there is now simply one 
test to establish dishonesty, and fraud, in both branches of  law. First the ‘actual state of  mind as to 
knowledge or belief  as to facts’ must be established by a ‘fact-finding tribunal’. Second, ‘whether [a 
defendant’s] conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the 
(objective) standards of  ordinary decent people’.72 This means that (1) if  a fact-finding Tribunal has made 
statements about the ‘actual state of  mind’ of  an employer, and (2) this falls below objective social 
standards of  honesty, there could be fraud. Only stage (1) requires any assertion of  fact by a claimant 
about a defendant. Stage (2) is an application of  law, with regard to the social context.  
 Although there is now one test for fraud, there are obviously criminal and civil categories of  
                                                     
67 Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 209  
68 Gisda Cyf  v Barratt [2010] UKSC 41, [39]  
69 [1999] 2 AC 349  
70 Pankhania v Hackney LBC [2002] EWHC 2441 (Ch). See Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [118]-[119]  
71 cf  R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2. This had two part test (and therefore fraud), requiring (1) someone to have done 
something dishonest by honest people’s standards, and (2) to have subjectively appreciated others would think it dishonest. 
Part (2) has now changed, so there is no requirement to appreciate one has been dishonest. This adopted Royal Brunei Airlines 
Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] UKPC 4, per Lord Nicholls, ‘not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances’. Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, as properly interpreted by Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37, 
[10] per Lord Hoffmann, ‘by ordinary standards a defendant’s mental state would be characterised as dishonest.’ 
72 [2017] UKSC 67, [74]. The case held that Ivey was unable to claim £7.7m in winnings from the Genting Casinos because he 
had won by cheating, by ‘edge sorting’ with an accomplice, at a card game called Punto Banco. 
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consequence. The Fraud Act 2006 imposes a maximum 10 year prison sentence for fraud by ‘false 
representation’ to make a ‘gain’, and company directors, managers or officers who have consented or 
connived in the scheme are jointly liable.73 In civil law, fraud is relevant in actions for breach of  trust, or 
vitiating contracts for misrepresentation. It is also relevant for exemplary damages, where a defendant’s 
‘conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself  which may well exceed the 
compensation payable.’74 Yet whether criminal or civil, ‘fraud unravels everything’,75 including separate 
legal personality of  companies that are ‘used as an engine of  fraud.’76 Moreover, whether civil or criminal, 
there are strong professional incentives for lawyers not to make fraud allegations without significant proof  
of  the facts. In addition, allegations of  the subjective element of  fraud (at stage (1)) which assert a fact 
about someone’s state of  mind, may raise a spectre of  defamation claims, something that even academic 
authors and publishers would be imprudent to ignore.77  
 
(2) UBER  
In Aslam v Uber BV, the Employment Tribunal itself  made certain critical findings of  fact. It said the 
following.78 
 
This is, we think, an excellent illustration of  the phenomenon of  which Elias J warned in the 
Kalwak case79 of  “armies of  lawyers” contriving documents in their clients’ interests which simply 
misrepresent the true rights and obligations on both sides.  
 
This finding (relevant for stage (1) of  the fraud test) could be a serious cause for concern. Aslam and 
other drivers had claimed they were entitled to the minimum wage and paid holidays.80 For this they 
needed to be ‘workers’, either by having ‘employee’ status, or non-employee-workers who personally 
perform work but not for a client or customer.81 In the contracts between Uber and its drivers, the so 
called ‘Partner Terms’ asserted that an Uber driver would be ‘an employee or business partner of... the 
Partner’ of  Uber, even though typically the ‘Partner’ was the driver itself.82 In this way, it attempted to 
deny that the drivers were employees or workers of  Uber. The Tribunal held the drivers were workers for 
Uber, leaving open whether the drivers might also count as Uber’s employees. Indeed Uber itself  
suggested drivers could be employees, just of  their own companies or other entities.83  
                                                     
73 Fraud Act 2006 ss 1(3), 2 and 12(2). Also ‘cheating the Revenue’ remains an offence: Theft Act 1968 s 32 
74 Rookes v Barnard [1964] UKHL 1, per Lord Devlin  
75 See Petrodel Ltd v Prest [2013] UKSC 34, [18] quoting Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, 712, per Denning LJ  
76 [2013] UKSC 34, [89] per Lady Hale  
77 cf  Defamation Act 2013 ss 5-6 (on the extent of  privilege for academic journals).  
78 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4, [96]. Also at [83] Uber’s written terms ‘are designed to misrepresent’ the relationship.  
79 Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak [2007] IRLR 560 (EAT) [57]  
80 National Minimum Wage Act 1998 s 1 and Working Time Regulations 1998 reg 13  
81 Employment Rights Act 1996 s 230(3)(b)  
82 [2017] IRLR, [32] 
83 [2017] IRLR, [93] ‘the drivers fall full square within the terms of  the 1996 Act, s 230(3)(b) . It is not in dispute that they 
undertake to provide their work personally. For the reasons already stated, we are clear that they provide their work ‘for’ Uber. 
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 The Tribunal’s language, brandishing Shakespeare, suggests that it was completely unpersuaded by 
Uber’s submissions.84 In particular, the Short Oxford Dictionary of  English defines ‘contrive’ as meaning 
to ‘create or bring about (an object or a situation) by deliberate use of  skill and artifice’. If  written 
assertions by ‘armies of  lawyers’ of  non-employment status are ‘deliberate’ and also a ‘misrepresentation’, 
does this mean that the Employment Tribunal has made a finding of  an ‘actual state of  mind’ which 
amounts to fraud? The Employment Appeal Tribunal has repeated the same finding,85 and may have even 
gone further. While the question on appeal remained confined to worker status, as the drivers claimed the 
minimum wage and holiday pay, Eady J emphasised passages from UNISON on the need for proper 
enforcement of  employee rights, given the inherent imbalance of  power.86  
 There seems to be increasingly little doubt, if  any, from the findings of  facts in Aslam that Uber 
drivers are workers in UK law and could well be employees, just like the car valets were employees in 
Autoclenz. The Tribunal elaborated on the way that Uber drivers are monitored and controlled on take-it-
or-leave-it contracts.87 Indeed, the surveillance is invasive: literally tracking the drivers’ every move. While 
they have some leeway, Uber drivers face a system of  sanctions for not taking a quota of  rides.88 It follows 
that Uber drivers pass all tests for employee status in Autoclenz: they do work for a wage, they are 
controlled, and they personally perform work. They even fulfil the non-requirement of  ‘mutuality of  
obligation’. Furthermore, the EAT explicitly upheld the finding that Uber drivers are still working for 
Uber when they do not have passengers, but are “on call” awaiting the next ride.89 Uber exercises all the 
functions of  a typical employer.90 Uber’s contracts were misrepresenting that economic reality. 
 Could Uber argue that the Employment Tribunal has made no finding about its ‘actual state of  
mind’ (stage (1))? Perhaps it could, although it would have to contend with the fact that its senior 
management will be very aware that an accelerating number of  jurisdictions have held that Uber drivers 
are its employees. These include findings in a Hamburg Administrative Court in Germany for the purpose 
                                                                                                                                                                      
We are equally clear that they do so pursuant to a contractual relationship. If, as we have found, there is no contract with the 
passenger, the finding of  a contractual link with Uber is inevitable.... Just as in Autoclenz, the employer is precluded from 
relying upon its carefully crafted documentation because, we find, it bears no relation to reality. And if  there is a contract with 
Uber, it is self-evidently not a contract under which Uber is a client or customer of  a business carried on by the driver. We 
have already explained why we regard that notion as absurd.’  
84 [2017] IRLR 4, [87] quoting W Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene ii, ‘The lady doth protest too much, methinks.’  
85 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] UKEAT 0056_17_1011, [73]  
86 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [6] per Lord Reed, ‘Relationships between employers and employees are 
generally characterised by an imbalance of  economic power. Recognising the vulnerability of  employees to exploitation, 
discrimination, and other undesirable practices, and the social problems which can result, Parliament has long intervened in 
those relationships so as to confer statutory rights on employees, rather than leaving their rights to be determined by freedom 
of  contract. In more recent times, further measures have also been adopted under legislation giving effect to EU law. In order 
for the rights conferred on employees to be effective, and to achieve the social benefits which Parliament intended, they must 
be enforceable in practice.’  
87 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4, [48]-[51] explaining positive instructions, presentation, and surveillance through app.  
88 Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4, [51]-[53] explaining the penalty mechanisms for failing to work to meet Uber’s demand.  
89 [2017] UKEAT 0056_17_1011, [119]-[124] per Judge Eady QC. It is, however, respectfully submitted that it was an error to 
say at [121] ‘there will simply be no mutuality of  obligation between assignments’ for zero hours contracts. Aside from 
‘mutuality of  obligation’ not being a requirement for a contract, there is no credible authority or principled reason to 
distinguish ‘assignment specific work’, for the purpose of  any employment right, from piece, time, salaried or unmeasured 
work. A contract is presumed continuous unless shown otherwise: ERA 1996 s 210(5). Temporary cessations of  work from 
one to 25 weeks do not break a contract’s continuity (s 212), so why would a break of  15 minutes or an hour?  
90 See J Prassl, The Concept of  the Employer (OUP 2015) reviewed in (2017) 37(2) Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 482.  
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of  social security (below), in Sao Paulo, Brazil also for social security,91 in South Africa,92 Switzerland,93 
and even in Uber’s home state after a ruling of  the California Labor Commission.94 There are conflicting 
opinions.95 But most intriguingly, the Court of  Justice of  the European Union has given an unusually 
strong indication that it thinks the same. In a preliminary reference from Spain, the CJEU was asked to 
decide whether Uber is a transport service.96 Uber (as well as denying that its drivers are employees or its 
passengers are consumers) denied that it is a transport service. It wanted to be an ‘information society 
service’, ostensibly because Uber uses online software, to get freedom to forum shop between member 
state laws.97 The Grand Chamber, unsurprisingly, rejected Uber’s argument that it was not a transport 
service. But in doing so it went out of  its way, quite unnecessarily, to outline critical factors about Uber 
drivers:98 
 
from the information before the Court that the intermediation service provided by Uber is based 
on the selection of  non-professional drivers using their own vehicle, to whom the company 
provides an application without which (i) those drivers would not be led to provide transport 
services and (ii) persons who wish to make an urban journey would not use the services provided 
by those drivers. In addition, Uber exercises decisive influence over the conditions under which 
that service is provided by those drivers. On the latter point, it appears, inter alia, that Uber 
determines at least the maximum fare by means of  the eponymous application, that the company 
receives that amount from the client before paying part of  it to the non-professional driver of  the 
vehicle, and that it exercises a certain control over the quality of  the vehicles, the drivers and their 
conduct, which can, in some circumstances, result in their exclusion.  
 
In other words, Uber exercises all the functions of  an employer, and its drivers fulfil all the criteria of  
employees: under control for conditions of  service, payments, the quality of  vehicles, and subject to ‘the 
ultimate sanction for good conduct, the power of  dismissal.’99 
 
(3) THE COST OF MISREPRESENTING RIGHTS 
It is sometimes thought gig-economy staff  benefit from not being classified as employees. First, it is true 
that non-employee workers potentially pay less in tax by receiving generous deductions for business 
expenses expenses, for instance for vehicles and running costs. On the other hand, they lose the chance to 
                                                     
91 ‘Sao Paulo Judge: Uber Drivers Are Employees, Deserve Benefits’ (14 April 2017) Fortune.  
92 ‘Uber drivers are now considered employees in South Africa – here’s what it means’ (14 July 2017) BusinessTech. 
93 ‘Uber vs Suva in Swiss driver employee ruling’ (5 January 2017) Euronews. 
94 S Sanders, ‘California Labor Commission Rules Uber Driver Is An Employee, Not A Contractor’ (17 July 2015) NPR. 
95 e.g. D Marin-Guzman, ‘Uber wins Fair Work Commission case over drivers’ employment rights’ (5 January 2018) Australian 
Financial Review, pointing out that the driver in the case had no legal representation.  
96 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL (2017) C-434/15  
97 Electronic Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC art 3 and Information Society Standards Directive 98/34/EC art 1(2) 
98 (2017) C-434/15, [39]  
99 cf  Cassidy v Ministry of  Health [1951] 2 KB 343, per Denning LJ    
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receive the same assets and materials for which an employing entity could itself  make deductions. Second, 
self-employed people do usually pay 9, not 12 per cent in National Insurance Contributions.100 But the 
monetary value of  rights probably outweighs this 3 per cent gap.101  
 However the cost of  lacking employee status is not solely borne by the staff. There is also a vital 
public interest. According to a 2016 survey by HMRC, taxpayers see corporate tax avoidance (let alone 
evasion) as dishonest.102 This is potentially relevant for a stage (2) in a claim for fraud, on people’s 
objective standards of  dishonesty. In addition to employee contributions, there is normally a 13.8 per cent 
employer contribution for National Insurance. For example, in London alone Uber claims it has 40,000 
drivers. Assuming an Uber driver is earning the UK median wage, this means Uber could be avoiding 
around £2820.19 per driver each year in National Insurance Contributions. Assuming Uber’s driver 
numbers are roughly accurate, this could mean a loss of  £112,806,720 every year, in London, alone to the 
National Insurance Fund.103 Even if  an individual might choose (or is misled) to pay 3 per cent less in 
National Insurance contributions the short-term, there is a long-term public interest in ensuring everyone 
has properly funded retirement and social insurance. Nevertheless, the attempt to not pay this kind of  tax 
or social security contributions appears to have become essential to business model of  companies like 
Uber, CitySprint,104 Deliveroo,105 and others. It continues wherever rights are under-enforced.  
 Yet Uber and the others wait for someone to sue, and have a record of  threatening public 
authorities with open conflict, if  they do.106 Already with a million drivers in 2015,107 Uber stands among 
the world’s largest employers, yet claims it has no employees, and its employees have no rights. It argues 
the same with its consumers. If  companies are not acknowledging employment rights, or not paying taxes 
and social security contributions that are properly due, this creates a regulatory subsidy. It can enable and 
finance a strategy of  loss making expansion. Indeed, Uber lost $2.8 billion in 2016.108 In UK and EU 
competition law, there is a strong possibility that such behaviour could be challenged as predatory 
pricing.109 It rests on investor speculation that national regulators will fold, and courts in major 
                                                     
100 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 ss 1, 5 and 8 
101 e.g. ERA 1996 s 86, notice or pay in lieu before dismissal by itself  wholly offsets extra NICs for anyone working between one 
month and 33.3 weeks (3% NICs x 33.3 = one week’s pay). Also SSCBA 1992 s 151-155 on statutory sick pay. ERA 1996 ss 
71-75K on paid child care leave. Devonald v Rosser & Sons [1906] 2 KB 728, on right to expected pay if  no work is available, etc  
102 e.g. HMRC and Preena Shah, ‘Exploring public attitudes to tax avoidance in 2015’ (2016) HM Revenue and Customs Research 
Report 401, finding ‘the majority (61%) also responded that it was never acceptable to use a tax avoidance scheme. The most 
frequent reason given as to why it was unacceptable was that ‘it is unfair on others who pay their taxes’.’ 
103 If  National Insurance Contributions by employers are 13.8 per cent, and Uber drivers are earning £28,600, NICs should be 
£2820.19. This multiplied by 40,000 drivers in London means £112,806,720. However, it is doubtful that Uber’s claims of  
40,000 drivers in London can be trusted: many of  these will not be full time employees. It is also doubtful that Uber’s driver 
employees are all earning the median wage each year, despite Uber’s claims about how good driver conditions are. Therefore 
these calculations must be seen as a rough hypothesis, yet one that indicates the potential problem’s scale.  
104 See Dewhurst v CitySprint UK Ltd (5 January 2017) Unreported. See (7 January 2017) BBC News.  
105 e.g. S Butler, ‘Deliveroo accused of  ‘creating vocabulary’ to avoid calling couriers employees’ (5 April 2017) Guardian  
106 e.g. A Kassam, ‘Uber threatens to leave Quebec in protest at new rules for drivers’ (26 September 2017) Guardian  
107 L Lazo, ‘Uber turns 5, reaches 1 million drivers and 300 cities worldwide. Now what?’ (4 June 2015) Washington Post. At the 
time of  writing, Uber is operating in over 600 cities.  
108 L Hook, ‘Uber registers $2.8bn loss in 2016 expansion drive’ (14 April 2017) Financial Times  
109 See Competition Act 1998 s 18, TFEU art 102 and Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet (2012) C-209/10, [45]. cf  B Rogers, 
‘The Social Costs of  Uber’ (2015) 82 University of  Chicago Law Review Dialogue 85, in a superb article for the US, suggests: 
‘Concerns about monopoly therefore seem premature.’ US antitrust law has been deregulated out of  existence. At 100, Rogers 
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jurisdictions will not enforce the law.  
 More and more jurisdictions, however, are enforcing their laws. Germany’s case is most 
instructive. Uber was held to have violated taxi licensing requirements in September 2014.110 On appeal, 
the High Administrative Court of  Hamburg stressed that taxi licenses required payment of  income tax 
and social security contributions,111 which follow from Uber drivers having employee status. But then, 
Uber kept running unlicensed vehicles. So in 2015, Uber was penalised €250,000 for each violation.112 This 
led to Uber’s withdrawal from Germany. Since then, Uber refused to comply with the law, and was banned 
from Denmark,113 to Italy,114 to Finland.115 In Taiwan, Uber was banned until it agreed to use drivers who 
were employees of  rental car companies.116 In Spain and France, its apps have been banned too. Finally, in 
September 2017, Transport for London announced it would revoke Uber’s licence, primarily for its 
repeated failure to abide by the laws on reporting rape and sexual assault of  Uber passengers.117  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout the UK the law must be upheld, including an end to sham-self-employment. Corporations 
which misrepresent other people’s rights should not be regarded as legitimately defending their legal 
position. The costs to employees, consumers, and taxpayers are too high. It is irrelevant that tax 
authorities, bound by government priorities and with limited resources, have not acted themselves. Indeed, 
they are often waiting for clarification in court. The calculation to profit from the law’s under-enforcement 
justifies exemplary damages: both to strip all profits in an individual case,118 and further to ensure no 
business model may exploit the law’s under-enforcement.119 Economic innovation brought about by 
technological ingenuity is no doubt a public good, but cultivating legal uncertainty through aggressive 
litigation ‘may also produce large profits for powerful business interests’ that courts would rightly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
mentions the absurd risk that Uber may sue its own drivers for organising unions: this directly violates the Clayton Act of  
1914 §6 (15 USC §17), on any reasonable interpretation. At 102, Rogers highlights Uber’s ‘size, power, and ambitions’.  
110 See ‘Berlin and Hamburg ban for taxi app Uber’ (29 September 2014) Out-law.com and K Rawlinson, ‘Uber service ‘banned’ 
in Germany by Frankfurt court’ (2 September 2014) BBC News.  
111 Hamburg High Administrative Court Judgment (24 September 2014) Az. 3 Bs 175/14, [26] ‘Denn es sprechen überragende 
Interessen der Allgemeinheit dafür, dass Gelegenheitsverkehr zur Personenbeförderung jedenfalls dann nicht genehmigungsfähig ist, wenn, wie 
vorliegend, der Unternehmer für die gewerbliche Nutzung nicht versicherte Fahrzeuge einsetzt und das Entrichten von Einkommensteuern und 
Sozialabgaben für die Fahrer sowie von Umsatzsteuern für die Entgelte in dem Geschäftsmodell nicht vorgesehen sind. Zum einen kann die 
Allgemeinheit ohne die verlässliche Zahlung von Steuern und Sozialabgaben nicht funktionsfähig bleiben. Daher gehört die Pflicht, beide 
abzuführen, zu den zulässigen Einschränkungen der Berufswahlfreiheit. ’ This translates as: ‘It is in the overriding interests of  the 
public, that service vehicles for personal transportation are under no circumstances authorised, if, as in the present case, the 
undertaking deploys uninsured vehicles for commercial use and does not provide for the payment of  income taxes and social 
contributions [i.e. pensions, health care, unemployment, etc] in its business model. For one thing, public administration 
cannot function without the reliable payment of  taxes and social contributions. Therefore the duty in both respects exists as a 
permissible limitation on the freedom to conduct a business.’  
112 ‘Uber banned in Germany as police swoop in other countries’ (20 March 2015) BBC News reporting Landgericht Frankfurt 
am Main Judgment (18 March 2015) Az. 3-08 O 136/14 (in German)  
113 R Milne, ‘Uber shuts down business in Denmark’ (28 March 2017) Financial Times  
114 T Bradshaw, ‘Uber faces another setback after ban in Italy’ (8 April 2017) Financial Times  
115 A Hern, ‘Uber presses pause on primary taxi service in Finland until 2018’ (6 July 2017) Guardian  
116 B Bland, ‘Uber running out of  road in Taiwan’ (5 January 2017) Financial Times and SH Hsuan, ‘Uber is back – without 
‘Uber drivers’’ (14 April 2017) China Post.   
117 N McIntyre, ‘Uber London ban: The scandals that brought down the ride-hailing app’ (22 September 2017) Independent.  
118 See Kuddus v Chief  Constable of  Leicestershire [2002] 2 AC 122, especially per Lord Nicholls at [67]  
119 D Owen, ‘A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform’ (1994) 39(2) Villanova Law Review 363, 380-1 
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scrutinise with particular sensitivity.120 The private gains of  the gig-economy today are outweighed by the 
social cost to everyone else. We must not be distracted, as the Taylor Review seemed to be, by glitzy 
rhetoric of  techno-utopia. Frequently this conceals hard conflicts of  interest, like those of  the Taylor 
Review member who had been profiting from Deliveroo shares.121 If  the law is upheld the benefits of  
technology, instead of  disproportionately enriching a few, will create a truly ‘sharing economy’.  
 
 
                                                     
120 To paraphrase Lord Walker in R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton CC [2010] UKSC 20, [81] on compulsory 
purchase used to benefit private corporations. Business must not compulsorily purchase other people’s employment rights. 
121 A Ram, ‘Taylor review member was early Deliveroo backer’ (10 July 2017) Financial Times. Greg Marsh’s excuse to the paper 
was he ‘engaged transparently with the Taylor review’. No disclosure is in the Review itself. 
